ABSTiACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

that the defendant had a perfect right to construct the dam on his
own ground, and therefore he committed no wrongful act in the
county of Stark for which a suit would lie against him. If every
person is free to use his own property as he may desire, he cannot
do so in such a way as to encroach upon the rights of his neighbor.
Hence the appellee in constructing this dam upon his own land
knowing at the same time that in the ordinary course of things, it
must cause the injurious flooding of appellant's premises, was
doing an act which lie had no right to perform. For in that case
he was making use of his land in such a manner as to interfere
with the rights of adjoining proprietors. Being unable to discover
any sufficient reason why he should not be made to, answer for that
wrongful use in the county where the act was committed, the judgment of the circuit court will be reversed and the cause remanded.
PILLSBURY, J., dissented.
Judgment reversed.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ENGLISH COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY.1
2
SUPREM1E COURT OF KANSAS.
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN. 3
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.'
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.
ACTION.

Implied (lontract- Tort-Set off.-A cause- of action founded upon
an i1mplied contract may be the subject of set.off: Fanson v. Linsley,

20 Kans.
Whenever one person commits a wrong or tort against the estate of
another with the intention of benefiting his own estate, the law will, at
the election of the party injured, imply or presume a contract on the
part of the wrongdoer to pay to the party injured th& full value of all

benefits resulting to such wrongdoer: Id.
But where one person commits a wrong or tort against another, without any intention of benefiting, his own estate, and his own estate is nob
thereby benefited, the law will not imply or presume a contract on the
part of such wrongdoer to pay for the resulting damages : Id.
1 Selected from late numbers of the Law Reports.
2 From Ion. W. C. Webb, Reporter; to appear in 20 Kansas Reports.
3 Prepared expressly for tie American Law Register, from opinions delivered
at tie April Term 1878. Tie cases will probably be reported in 38 or 39 Micligin Reporti.
4 From A. Wilson Norri,, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 85 Penna. St. Reports.
5 From Ilon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 44 Wisconsin Reports.
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On CQntractmade by anotherfor Plainttiff'sbvefit.-As a general rule
an action on a contract must be brought in the name of the party having the legal interest therein : Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Penna. St.
A third party may maintain an action in his own name upon a contract made expressly for his benefit where his release would be a sufficient discharge to the promisor, but not where it would- leave the promisor
liable to an action by the other contracting party: IdI.
On Payment to another Person to use of Plaintiff.--The rule that
if one party pay money to another for the use of a third person. or having money belonging to another, agrees with that other to pay it to a
third, an action lies by the person beneficially interested, does not apply
where the contract is for the benefit of the contracting party and the
third person is a stranger to the contract and eonsiderati, n ; the action
then must be by the promisee: Guthrie v. Kerr, 85 Penna. St.
Where the contract leaves the promisor subject to a suit by the promisee or his personal representatives, and likewise to a third person
beneficially interested, the latter cannot maintain an action : Id.
A legatee cannot maintain a common-law' proceeding against the debtor
of his testator's estate : Id.
AGENT.

Declarationof.-The declaration of an agent when acting within the
scope of his agency, and when made in connection with some transactions as such, are receivable as part of the res gestm, but mere possession of chattels by an agent cannot empower him to admit away the
title of his principal : The Michigan Punching Machine and Afanufacturing Co. v. Eugene Purcell,S. C. Mich., April Term 1878.
To Sell not authorized to Barter.-Neitherby the common law nor
under any statute of this state, can a person intrusted with merchandise
simply as an agent for the sale thereof, dispose of it by barter to one
who knows the goods bartered for to be for the agent's own use, or
pledge it for his own indebtedness for goods sold to him as for his own
use : Victor Sewing .fachine Co. v. .eller, 44 Wis.
Sect. 3, ch. 91 of 1863, which provides that a factor or agent not
having the documentary evidence of title, who shall be intrusted with
* the possession of any merchandise for the purpose of sale, &c., shall be
deemed the true owner thereof so far as to give validity to any contract made by him with any other person for the sale or disposition of
such merchandise "for any money advanced or negotiable instrument or
other obligation in writihtg given by such other person on the faith thereof," is inapplicable in terms to the case above stated; and, being in
derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed. Price v.
Wis., A. & F. Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 267, distinguished : Id.
AssuMPSIT.

See Action.

Trespasser-Implied Promise.-Assumpsit does not lie for the value
of personal property taken by a trespasser and applied to his own use.
The law implies no promise under such circumstances: Tolan v. Hloge,
boom, S. C. Mich., April Termi 1878.
BAILMENT.

See Negligence.
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BILLS AN)

NOTES.

Aetfin on Lost j\7ote-Indemnnity.-Where a note though negntiable,

is ptatIe to order and unendorsed and is accidentally destroyed by fire

while in the possession of the payee : Hold, the payee can maintain an
action on snch lost instrument without first tendering or giving a bond of
indemnity : WVdles, Adin'r, v. Wade, 20 Kans.
Acceptance of Bill by one P1artner.-Itis well settled that an acceptante by a partner in his own name of a bill of exchange drawn upon
th, firn, for goods sold to it, binds the firm Tolman and another v.
I1,nruhan, 44 Wis.
(ontract implied from, Endorsement-Parol Evidence not admissible
to cary.-The contract which the law implies from the endorsement of
a negotiable note is as conclusive against parol testimony as though itwere written out in full above the endorser's sigqature: Doolittle v.
Ferry et al, 20 Kans.
Parol testimony is inadmissible to change a simple unqualified endorsement, whether in full or in blank, into an endorsement without recourse:
Id.
IrregularEadorsement.-The names of the payees appeared on the
back of a note in the usual position of the first endorser, about three.
inches from the left end, and that of the defendant in the opposite direction, about the same distance from the right end of the note, so that the
latter with reference to the former may be said to have been inierted.
.iebl, that this irregular endorsement did not relieve the defendant of
liability, as he could have recourse against the payees : Arnot's Adm'r
v. Symonds, 85 Penna. St.
See Prescription.
Monuments.-In determining disputed boundaries, original monuments
will govern, if they can be found and identified; Marsh v. Mitchell, 25
Wis. 706; and if none such caui be fbund at the lot or block in disput6,
more distant monuments may be consulted, from which a survey and
measurements may be made: Nys v. Biemeret, 44 Wis.
If no certain monuments can be found, nor any data to determine
courses and distances, long-continued occupancy and acquiescence, and
even reputation and hearsay, as to boundaries, may have weight: Id.
BOUNDARY.

(tICATTEL MORTGAGE.

Without detual Considertion-Rihtsof Assignee.-Where a chattel
mortgage not securing negotiable paper is given for a sum named, but
really to secure future advan'ces, and none have been made, an assignee,
though taking it for value and in good faith, supposing it to have been
given for an actual indebtedness, has no rights superior to those of the
mortgagee: Judge v. Vogel, S. C. Mich., April Term 1878.
COMMON CARRIER.

Special Conditions-Alternatire Rates.-The plaintiff, under a
contract in writing signed by his agent. delivered to the defendants
certain cheeses, to be carried from L. to S. at -owner's risk." As
the plaintiff knew, the defendants bad two rates of carriage, a higher
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rate when they took the ordinary liability of carriers, and a lower, when
they were relieved of all liability, except that arising from the wilful
miscoi'duct 0f 'tlhir servants. In-using the 'words "owners risk," the
plaintiff intended that'the checeses should be carried, at the lower rate,
and subject'to ' the conditions restricting the defendants' 'liability. The
defendaits' servants packed the cheeses in 'such a ihianner' that durin,g
their transit upon the delendants' 'railway they'were damaged, but the
delbndauts"servants did not know that dancaze would result, froim the
mode in which-the cheeseswere packed.
blel,
that as the defendants
carried at alternative rates, the e6ndition exvepting-theim fromn liability
when carrying at the lower rate was just and reasonable, .ind that the
injury to thecheeses had not arisen from the wilful misconduct of their
servants : Lewis y, The Great Western Railway Cu
0., Law Rep. 3 Q. B.
D. (Ct. App.).
CONST.ITUTIQVAb TLAW;

Statute-lnqury by Courts int9 Action of Legislature-in'passing.An alleged disregar'd of the forms of legislation requiied by the constitution in the passage of a law is not the subject of judicial inquiry,' SO
far as the duty and conscience of the members of the legislature is involved, the law is mandatory. They are bound by their-oaths to obey
the constitutional mode of, proceeding, and any intentional. disregard is
a breachof duty and, a violation of. their. Oaths: But when a law has
been passed and approved and certified in due form the courts cannot
go behind ,the law as duly certified, to inquire into the observance of
form in its passage: Kilgore v. Magee, 85 ]Peuna. St.
CONTRACT.

See Action.

Rescission of Sale- Warranty- Offer to return Prl)erty-Danages.
-To constitute a rescission of a contract of sale for breach of warranty
the vendee's'offer to -return the property should be unconditional,, and
should assign the breach of warranty as'the ground thereof. Churchill
y. Price;441 Wis:
The warranty claimed. in a sale of oxen was, that' they were sound
and true, and in all, re~peets suitable fof'. defendant's 'purposes. 'There
was proof that some time after the purchase, the vendee wrote to the
veudor that he was so much disappointed in' the oxen that,he would not
pay the note l had given the vendor -for $118, the purchase price;
that they were not worth $75; and that the vendor might take them
away, upon which vendee would pay for the use of them, or might leave
thei,'in which case he"would pay $75 for them. hel, that there was
no error in refusing to insttuct the jury'upon this evidence i as matter
of law, that defendant'had rescinded the contract: Id
It is generally a quettion of fact for the jury, whether an offer to
return goods sold,'and rescind the contract, is made within a reasonable time: I.
A continued use of the whole or a part of the property sold, after
an alleged offer to rescind, i's inconsistent with the claim to have
rescinded, or at,least strong evidence agaiust it: Id.
'
In assessing damages for a breach of warranty, the jury are not bound
to accept the amount estimated by any of the witnesses, nor the average
of the amounts estimated by different witnesses, but must exercise their
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own judgment upon all the facts in evidence, including the opinions of
witnesses as to the difference between the actual value of the article
and what it would have been worth, if as warranted : Id.
Sale of Intoxicating Liquors-Illegal Consideration.-A sale of intoxicating liquors made while the prohibiting law was in force is not a lawful considoration for a promise subsequent to the repeal of the act:
Ludlow v. lardy, S. C. Mich., April Term 1878.
CORPORATION.

Foreign-Saitsby.-Foreign corporations may maintain suits in the
courts of this state ; and foreign insurance companies may take securities in this state for debts due them friom residents thereof, without complying with the stttutrv conditions to their transaction here of the
business of insuranza : 'harter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Sawyier, 44 Wis.
CRIUMNAL LAW.
See Jury.
Evilence-DyjingDeeltrations- Witness- Co.defendan t.-Where several parties unite to makean assault, which results in homicide, the acts
and declarations of the defendant immediately prior to the assault, what
was said in his presence by those acting in concert with him, and what
occurred after the attack, are competent evidence: Kehoe v. The CommOnwealth, 85 Penna. St.
[n a trial for homicide it was shown that the deceased was terribly
beaten and left insensible by his assailants. He was carried to a house
near by, atnd on the following morning started to his home, about a mile
distant, unaccompanied and on foot. About midway to his home he was
iinn by an acquaintance, whom he accosted, saying, " Bill, it is all-up
with me; I will never get over it;" and then went on to speak of his
wounds and how they were inflicted, and from the effects of which he
died two days thereafter. Bield, that this evidence was properly received as dying declarations : Id.
Where one has been convicted of an infamous crime, but not sentenced, and motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial are pending, lie is not a competent witness for another who was jointly indicted
for the same offence and granted a separate trial : Id.
Where several parties are jointly indicted and separate trials granted,
one who has not yet been tried is not a competent witness for either of
the others on trial : I1.

DAMAGES.

See Contract.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Attachment of Debt- Garnisheeorder-Salarynot .yet Payable.-The
salary of a medical or other officer cannot, before it is actually payable,
be attached by a garnishee order under the county court rules. 1875,
for it is not " a debt due, owing, or accruing" to the judgment debtor:
Jones v. Thompson. E. B. & E. 63, followed: Ball et al. v. Pritchett,
Law Rep. 3 Q B. Div.
DECEIT.

False Representations-Action.for.-Wherea party makes false representations of his solvency to induce credit, although at the time when
VoL. XXVf.-93
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made he believed them to' be true, he is not liable to an action of deceit,
and the state of his belief is a question for the jury : Dilworth v. Bradner et al., 85 Penna. St.
It was erroneous for the court to say that the jury must decide whether
the party making such representations had reasonable grounds for his
belief that they were true: Id.
EVIDENCE.

-See Bills and Notes.

FoREIGN CORPORATION.

See

Corporation.

FRAUD. See Deceit.
Mode of Averring.-Where relief is sought on the ground of fraud,
the complainant is not required to set forth correctly the true theory of
the fraudulent intent and purpose, and the means adopted to accomplish
it. It is sufficient to set forth the substance of the transaction and the
result, and relief will not be denied if it be shown that the fraud was
successfully accomplished, though in a manner different from that
charged: Merrill v. Allen, S. C. Mich., April Term 1878.
GARNISHEE.

See Debtor and Creditor.

Discontinuance.-Agarnishee proceeding is discontinued by plaintiffs
failure to appear on return of a summons to -show cause : Johnson ct al.
v. Dexter, S. C. Mich., April Term 1878.
Voluntary Appearance of Garnishees-Effect of Judgment.-A judgment against the garnishees upon their voluntary appearance to a second
summons issued after such discontinuance, does not bar a recovery against
them on a previous assignment from their creditor: Id.
GIT.
Delivery- Transfer of Stock.-T. transferred stock to F., a niece of
his wife, on the books of a corporation, but retained thd certificates in
his possession, and after his death they were found in an envelope, with
his own name and that of F. endorsed thereon. F. had no knowledge
of the transfer. She lived in the family. of T. and was in all respects
treated and regarded as his daughter. Reld (affirming the court below),
that the transfer on the books of the corporation vested in F. the legal
title to the stock and she was entitled to the same : Roberts's Appeal,
85 Penna. St.
ileld. fitrther, that the circumstances of the case rebutted the presumption of a resulting trust : id.
HIGHWAY.

ns.ifficiency of, is question of Fact-Not for Opinions of Experts.While in extreme cases the insufficiency of a highway may be so great
and manifest as to warrant the court in holding it insufficient. as a matter of law, the question is generally one of mere fact for the jury, upon
evidence of the actual condition of the highway : Benedict and Wife v.
City of Fond du Lac, 44 Wis.
Wh.ile there might possibly be eases in which the opinions of experts
would be admissible upon questions going to the sufficiency of a highway,
yet generally the question of such sufficiency is not one of science or
skill, and the opinions of witnesses thereon are inadmissible; and the
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exclusion in this case of such testimony of one who had been a civil
engineer, but did not appear to be an expert as to the construction of
highways, was not error: id.
INSURANCE. See Corporation.
Interest of Plaintiff at tine of Loss- Venldr in Possession-Intended
Demolition,of Premises under Conzdulsory Pozocrs.-The plaintiff insured
his premises in the defendants' office by a policy which provided that
their capital should be liable to pay to the assured" any loss or damage by
fire to the buildings" not exceeding 16001. The premises were afterwards required by the Metropolitan Board of Works, under their conipulsory powers, in order that they might be pulled down for the improvement of a street, and the amount of purchase-money payable to the plaintiff was assessed by arbitration, according to the Lands Clauses Act.
After the board had accepted the plaintiff's title, but before he had executed a conveyance, the premises were destroyed by fire : Held, that the
defendants were liable to pay the plaintiff 15001., the full value of the
buildings at the time of the fire, and not merely the damage done to the
buildings considered as old materials, for the dealings between the board
and the plaintiff did not affect the defendants' contract: Collingrilqev.
Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. Div.
JuRY.
Presence of Unauthorized Person during Deliberationsof.-It is the
duty of the courts to enforce a rigid and vigilant observance of the
provisions of the statutes designed to preserve inviolate the right of
trial by jury and the purity of such trials : State v. Snider, 20 Kans.
After a conviction of an accused for the offence of obtaining by fhlse
pretences the signature of a firm to a check of $850, and in support of
a motion fbr a new trial affidavits were filed proving that'the bailiff who
had the j.ry In charge, and who had testified on the trial on the part of
the pros~ehution to material facts against the prisoner, was with the jury
in the jury room the greater part of the tinie while they were deliberating on their verdict, and no explanation was made of the presence of
the officer with the jury in their consultations together, and the state
made no showing that the rights of the prisoner were not prejudiced by
the acts and conduct of such officer and witness : Held, that the verdict
should have been set aside and a new trial granted: Id.
LIBEL.

Publication.-An averment, in libel, that the defendant, "1composed,
uttered, wrote and sent to R. Dann & Co., in Milwaukee, Wis. (a commercial agency)," certain words concerning the plaintiff, sufficiently
avers publicatioaof the words : Benedict v. lVestover, 44 Wis.
Persons convicted of Felony-Effect qf enduring tLe PunishmentJustificatio.-n an action by the editor of a newspaper for libel in
calling him a " felon editor." the defendants justified, alleging that the
plaintiff had been convicted of felony and sentenced to twelve months'
hard labor. The plaintiff replied that after his conviction he underwent
his sentence of twelve months' imprisonment and hard labor and so
became as cleared from the crime and its consequences, as if he had
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received the Queen's pardon under the great seal. On demurrer : Hield,
a good reply : Leyiain v. Latimer, Law Rep. 3 Ex. Div.
Senmble, that it is defamatory to call a person who has been convicted
of tblony.'" a convicted felon," if he has received a pardon or suffered
his sentence : Id.
LIEN.

Statutes creating, to be strictly constred.-It is a general principle
that lien laws being innovations on the common law, their provisions
cannot be extended in their operation and effect beyond the plain sense
of their ternis, and parties asserting liens or titles resting upon them,
nst bring themselves and their titles distinctly within these terms:
W1'agar v. Jriscoe et al., S. C. Mich., April Term 1878.
MANDAMUS.

Impossibility of performing Statutory Duty-Want of Fund.The court will not issue a writ of mandamus against a public body
when it is clearly shown that the performance of the duty sought
to be enforced is impossible, by reason of want of funds not involving
any default on the part of such body. An order was issued by the
board of trade, under the 7th section of the Railway Clauses Act, 1863
(26 and 27 Vict., ch. 92), directing a railway company to make a bridge
for the purpose of carrying a turnpike road over their line instead of
crossing the same on the level. Previously to the making of this order
the company had exhausted all their powers of raising money in making
the line, and, the undertaking proving a Tilure, they had leased their
line in perpetuity to another company, and such lease was confirmed by
a special Act of Parliament. The lessees took all the profits of the line,
paying a portion of the interest due to the company's debenture stockholders. The company consequently had no funds for the construction
of the bridge. On an application for a mandamus to compel the company to comply.with the order of the board of trade, the alove facts
being shown, the court discharged the rule for the mandamus: Re The
.Bristol& North Somerset Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Q. B. Div.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

See Negligence.

"Railroad Contmny-1ispectioa (if Cars-.Negligence.-A railroad
company is under obligations to its employees to exercise reasonable diligence in inspecting and repairing its cars, and- is liable for injury to
an employee caused by a defect in one of its cars, which the company,
in the exercise of ordinary care, would have discovered and remedied:
Wedgwood v. (.& N. TV. Railway Co., 44 Wis.
The question of defend'ant's negligende was properly submitted to the
jury, upon evidence that a bolt in the brake beam of one of its cars
projected unnecessarily for a considerable distance, so as to be in the
way of a brakeman coupling such car to another, and that the injury
complained of, received by plaintiff while coupling for defendant, waz
caused by such projection : Id.
Such projection, if a defect, being an obvious one, which defendant
was bound to remedy, there was no error in refusing to charge the jury
that if the car became thus defective after it was first put in use by
defendant (several years before the accident), the latter was not liable
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unless it had notice of the defect. Smith v. The C., X. & St. P. Rilway Co., 42 Wis. 520, distinguished: Id.
After charging. that any contributory negligence of plaintiff at the
time of the accident would prevent a recovery, the court did not err in
refusing to charge that if plaintiff had as good opportunity or means of
knowing the defect as defendant had, but overlooked it. this was negligence which would prevent a recovery. And especially was this not
error where there was no evidence that plaintiff was familiar with the
car, or had ever before coupled it : Id.
- In the absence of proof that plaintiff was in charge of the car at the
time of the injury, except so far as is implied in his service as brakeman or had any duty of inspecting it, there was no error in refusing to
charge that it was his duty to observe any defect in it and to avoid it if
dangerous, and that his failure to do so would prevent a recovery: Id.
I

.'N1

ast.-A tenant for life may, when
Work inlg by Tenant for Lifenot precluded by restraining words, work open mines to exhaustion
Westmoreland Coal C'os .Appeal, 85 Penna St.
The term " mine," when applied to coal, is equivalent to a worked
vein, and if it be worked a tenant for life may pursue it to the boundaries of the tract: Ad..
Where there are two different tracts separated by an intervening
tract owned by another, with a vein extending beneath them, the opening on one tract does not extend to the other, and the tenant for life
minig under the unopened one is guilty of waste: Id.
See Master and Servant.

NEGLIGENCE.

Bank-Special .Deposit of Bonds.-A special deposit of bonds was
left by a customer with the cashier of a national bank for safe keeping,
with the knowledge of its directors, and the cashier gave a receipt therefor. The bonds were subsequently stolen and the bank offered no satisfactory explanation of the manner of the theft. Held, that there was
sufficient evidence of gross negligence to be submitted-to the jury.
HUeld, further, that a recovery could be had against the bank if the bonds
were stolen through the gross negligence of its officers: First..National
Bank of Carlisle v. Graham, 85 Penna. St.
NOTIcE.

See Possession.

PAINTINGS.

Paintingor Picture-Patternsand Designs.-Theword "paintings" in
the Carrier's Act (11 Geo. 4. and 1 William 4, oh. 68) sect. 1, is used
in its ordinary and popular sense to denote works of art. Colored imitations of rugs and carpets and colored working designs, each of them
valuable, and designed by skilled persons and hand painted, but having
no value as works of art. held, not to be paintings within the Carrier's
Act: Woodward v. The London & Northwestern Railway Co., Law
Rep. 3 Excb. Div.
See Bills and Notes.
Claim of one Partneragainstanother before Settlement- Waiver of
PARTNERSHIP.
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OI!j'ction by gohig to Trial.-It is the settled law of this state, that
before the partnership transactions are closed and an accounting had,
one partner has no claim a.gainst his co-partner individually on account
of such transactions, although a final settlement of the affairs of the
firm would show a balance inhis favor: Tob /rd v. To (ord, 44 Wis.
But where such a claim was set up in connection with other money
demands, and the case was fully tried and submitted to the jury upon
all the alleged causes of action, the objection that such claim was not a
valid cause of action not being taken in any form before or at the trial,
and a new trial being asked only on the ground that the verdict was
teldthat the error of law was
"contrary to law and the evidence :"
waived, and is no ground of reversal: Id.
Liability of Incoming Partner.-An incoming partner may undoubtedly by agreement become liable for debts contracted by the firm
previous to his entering it, but the presumption of law is against any
such liability and requires proof to remove it: Eountz v. .Holthouse, 85
Penna. St.
POSSESSION.

hrotice of Riglts.-Actual, open and notorious possession of land is
constructive notice of the possessor's rights ( Wickes v. Lake, 25 Wis.
71); and where C. was in possession of land under a parol contract of
sale, and 2K. took from C.'s vendor a mortgage of the land, with knowledge of C.'s possession, but in ignorance of his rights as purchaser, the
mo rtgage was void as against C. : Cunningham v. Brown, 44 Wis.
PRESCRIPTION.

Division Line agreed upqon and occipied for Twenty Years.-If two
coterininous proprietors agree upon and establish a dividing line between
their premises, and actually claim and occupy the land on each side of
that line, continuously, for twenty years, such possession is adverse, and
confers title by prescription: B,,der v. Zeise, 44 Wis.
Tn ejeetment, where there was a road along and over the strip of land
in controversy, and the respective parties or their grantors bad built
fences, adjoining the road, each on that side of it on which the body of
nis land lay: Held, that if the centre of the road was agreed upon and
established as the true boundary, and each party had claimed and occupied up to the fence maintained by him, for twenty years before the
action was commenced, he was precluded from claiming a different
boundary: Id.
IREILEVY N.

-Where a sheriff
Sale by Sheriff of wrong Person's Goos-Parties.
seizes the personal property of A. on an attachment against the property
of B., and thereafter he sells the same at a public sale, upon a valid
order of sale, after judgment, and at such sale delivers the actual possession of the property to the purchaser and thereafter has no actual nor
constructive possession of the property nor any iiterest therein, contingent or conjoint, and no part or connection with the detention of the
property from A. ; 1lehl, such sheriff is not a proper party defendant in
an action of replevin brought after such sheriff's sale to recover the
property and damages for its detention : Moses v. Morris, 20 Kans.
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Mixture of Goods with those of Another.-Where the plaintiff's goods
have been commingled with like goods of tile defendants by the wrongful act of a third party, replevin will nevertheless lie therefbr: 1l'ilkinson, Carter & Co. v. Stewart et al., 85 Penna. St.
It seems, however, that if the character of the goods is so essentially
changed by the mixture that one aliquot part would not be the equivalent for another, the case would present a different question : Id.
SALE. See Contract.
Implied Warranty of Merchantable Qualiy-Rescission.-A vendor
impliedly warrants goods sold by him without any opportunity of inspection on the part of the buyer to be of a merchantable quality and reasonably fit for the purpose intended, and if* when the goods are delivered
to the buyer, they are unmerchantable and unfit for use, the buyer may
return them without unnecessary delay and rescind the contract; and
if the goods on being returned to the vendor are injured or damaged
without any fault or negligence on the part of the buyer, such injury
does not prevent a rescission of the contract: Bigger v. Bovard, 20
Kans.
SET-OFF.
See Action.
Practice-Assignmentof Chose in Action-Set-of and Gounter-claim

for Damages against Assignee for Breach of Contract by Assignor.The statement of claim alleged that the plaintiff sued as assignee by
deed of a debt due from the defendant to the assignor on a building
contract. The defendant pleaded, by way of set-off and counter-claim,
that he was entitled to damages for breaches of contract by the assignor
to complete and deliver the buildings at the specified time, whereby the
defendant lost the use of them. On demurrer to so much of the defence
as alleged breaches of contract by the assignor : Held, that the defendant was not entitled to recover any damages against the plaintiff, but
was entitled by way of set-off or deduction from the plaintiff's claim to
the damages which he had sustained by the rzon-performance of the contract by the assignor, and that the form of the defence must be amended
accordingly: Young v. Kitchin. Law Rep. 3 Exch. Div.
STATUTE.
See ConstitutioneilLaw.
State Laws-Volumes published under Authority of State, Prnma
Facie Eoidence.-The publication of' an act in the bound volumes of
session laws of the year in which it purports to have been approved,
verified by the secretary of state, creates a presumption that it became
a law pursuant to the requireffients of the constitution : Bound v. 11isconsin Central Railroad Co., 44 Wis.
Where the journal of a branch of the legislature, published as required by the constitution, gives a list of the numbers and titles of
numerous bills in immediate succession, followed by the words "'was
read a third time," &c. : HeAd, that the word " was" is an obvious clerical error for " were," and the journal is evidence that all the bills
named in such list were read a third time: Id.
TIME.
Fractionof Day-Keeping Dog without License-License subsequently
obtained on the same Day.-On the 21st of October, the respondent

ABSTRACiS OF RECENT DEISIONS.

kept a dog without having in force a license granted under 30 Viet. c.
5. Ile thereby became liable to a penalty under s. 8. His default. was
discovered by the Excise, and he took out a license at a later hour on
the same day. Sect. 5 enacts that every license shall commence on the
day oilwhich the same shall be granted. An information against hiiii
laid before a magistrate, clihrged his offence to have been committed on
the 21st of October. At the hearing, he produced the license granted
on the 21st ofOctober, and the clarge was dismissed : eld, that the
dismissal was wrong, because an offence bad been committed on tile 21st
of October, and the subsequent license operated only from the timewhen
it was granted, and did not relate back to the earliest moment of that
day so ,sto justify the violation of the act before the license existed:
CanzS.ell v. Strangeways, Law Rep. 3 0. P. Div.
TORT.

See Action.

VERDICT.

Alteration. of,before Rccording.-After the delivery of the verdict,
the judge told the jurors that they were discharged; but immediately
thereafter, before they had left their seats or communicated with any
one, he called their attention to imperfections in the verdict, and put it
into the form which the jurors affirmed they intended, and, as amended,
it was signed by the foreman, and declared by the jury to be their verdict. Held, no error: Victor Sewing Machite Co. v. Relter, 44 Wis.
See Contract; Sale.

WARRANTY.
WASTE.

See Mine.

WILL.

Intoxicationas affecting TestamcntaryJ Calacity.-A will is not necessarily void for the testator's intoxication. Intoxication is a term capable
of no precise defihnition, and there are many degrees of it. If the act
which the testator.does, is one which his intoxication does not prevent
him from doing with cormprehension, it cannot of itself avoid it. ,As a
will is generally the result of previous deliberation, and not entirely of
the single interview when it is executed, it is not impossible for a person more or less intoxicated to make one which is not the product of the
intoxication : Pierce etal. v. Pierce et al., S. 0. Mich., April Term 1878.
The presumption of undue influence from the retention of a will
uncancelled by a testator, is nm more significant than such retention
would be in case of intoxication. The inference that it was not procured to be executed against his will or without his intelligent consent
arises as naturally in cases of asserted intoxication as in those of fraud
or undue influence: Id.
The question of the effect of intoxication upon the person's capacity
is not a scientific question to be determined by experts, but one within
common observation, depending on the facts of pach case, and as it is
a temporary condition, the testimony must be confined to the time involved in the transaction in controversy: .d.
WOBDS.

See Paintings.

